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NeteaseUrl/web/auth_state.py
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snowy-yang 183f5744d8 fix: 修复 7 处变量可能未绑定的真缺陷,类型检查升到 standard
为什么:IDE 里成片的黄色波浪线并非风格噪声。ruff 与 pyright(basic) 都是
0 报错,但 basic 会整体漏报「变量可能未绑定」这类**可执行缺陷**;实测
standard 多报 7 处且全部为真——异常处理器引用了尚未赋值的局部变量,一旦走进
异常分支就会 NameError 二次崩溃,把原始异常彻底掩盖。

- core/db.py, core/http_client.py:3 处 @asynccontextmanager 的返回标注
  AsyncIterator[X] 更正为 AsyncGenerator[X, None](前者不含 send 语义)
- core/state.py:三个模块级缓存补 TypedDict 建模。原先无标注的 dict 字面量被
  推断为「所有值类型的并集」(float | None),每个读写点都退化成联合类型;
  拆成 _VipCache(data 可为 None 表示未探测)与 _VipEntry(data 必定存在)后,
  类型检查立刻抓出 account.py 对未探测缓存的直接解包隐患
- services/batch.py:zip_valid 提到函数头。ZIP 构建前的业务错误(参数缺失/
  无歌曲)会 early raise,而异常处理器引用了该名字 → NameError 二次崩溃
- services/podcast.py:radio_name、pct 同理补初始化
- services/downloads.py:声明返回 str 却可能给出 None,改 `or ''` 满足契约
- web/routers/download.py:id_list 提前绑定
- web/auth_state.py:解包出的 c 未被使用
- pyproject.toml:typeCheckingMode 由 basic 升到 standard 作为门禁,并移除
  已被 standard 覆盖的 reportGeneralTypeIssues

门禁:ruff All checks passed · pyright(standard) 0 errors 0 warnings
2026-09-26 13:54:23 +08:00

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""认证的内存态与校验辅助(模块级状态,框架无关)。
包含:登录失败锁定、管理员 2FA 票据、发码 IP 限流、用户名/保留名校验。
这些状态**进程内共享**——登录/注册/2FA 各端点都读写同一份,避免「换个端点绕过锁定」。
"""
import secrets
import time
import auth_system as auth
# ---- 登录失败锁定(按用户名维度,10 分钟窗口内 >=5 次临时锁定)----
_LOGIN_FAILS: dict = {}
_LOGIN_FAIL_SWEEP_TS = 0.0
# 本锁定周期已落过审计日志的用户名(解锁或成功登录即重置)
_LOGIN_FAIL_LOGGED: set = set()
# ---- 管理员两步验证票据(内存态)----
_ADMIN_2FA: dict = {}
_ADMIN2FA_LAST_SEND: dict = {}
_LOGIN_FAIL_LIMIT = 5
_LOGIN_FAIL_WINDOW = 600
_LOGIN_FAIL_SWEEP_TS = 0.0
_ADMIN_2FA_TTL = 300 # 票据 5 分钟有效
_ADMIN_2FA_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 5 # 邮箱比对 + 验证码合计尝试上限
_ADMIN_2FA_MAX_TICKETS = 200 # 全局活票上限(防内存膨胀,挤掉最旧)
_ADMIN2FA_SEND_GAP = 20 # 同账号两次发码最小间隔(秒)——初版 60s 会卡住合法的背靠背重登(含矩阵双设备全流程),20s 已足以阻断紧密轰炸循环
def _admin2fa_purge() -> None:
now = time.time()
for t in [t for t, v in _ADMIN_2FA.items() if now - v['ts'] > _ADMIN_2FA_TTL]:
_ADMIN_2FA.pop(t, None)
def _admin2fa_mask(email: str) -> str:
"""邮箱掩码(审计日志与前端提示用):3*****@qq.com 样式"""
try:
local, dom = str(email).split('@', 1)
return (local[0] if local else '*') + '*****@' + dom
except Exception:
return '*****'
def _admin2fa_issue(user) -> str:
_admin2fa_purge()
# 每管理员仅 1 张活票——新票签发即销毁同账号旧票
for t in [t for t, v in list(_ADMIN_2FA.items()) if v['username'] == user['username']]:
_ADMIN_2FA.pop(t, None)
if len(_ADMIN_2FA) >= _ADMIN_2FA_MAX_TICKETS:
items = list(_ADMIN_2FA.items()) # 快照后再 min,防并发 pop 使迭代失效
if items:
oldest = min(items, key=lambda kv: kv[1]['ts'])[0]
_ADMIN_2FA.pop(oldest, None)
ticket = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
_ADMIN_2FA[ticket] = {'user_id': user['id'], 'username': user['username'],
'email': user['email'], 'ts': int(time.time()), 'attempts': 0}
return ticket
def _admin2fa_take(ticket: str):
"""取活票(不销毁):无票/过期返回 (None, None);命中返回 (ticket, 数据)。"""
_admin2fa_purge()
v = _ADMIN_2FA.get(ticket or '')
if not v:
return None, None
return ticket, v
def _login_fail_check(username: str) -> bool:
"""返回 True 表示允许尝试登录;锁定窗口内返回 False"""
global _LOGIN_FAIL_SWEEP_TS
now = time.time()
fails = [t for t in _LOGIN_FAILS.get(username, []) if now - t < _LOGIN_FAIL_WINDOW]
_LOGIN_FAILS[username] = fails
if len(fails) < _LOGIN_FAIL_LIMIT:
_LOGIN_FAIL_LOGGED.discard(username)
if len(_LOGIN_FAILS) > 10000 and now - _LOGIN_FAIL_SWEEP_TS > 60: # 容量上限(用户名为键,防无界增长)
_LOGIN_FAIL_SWEEP_TS = now
stale_users = [u for u, ts in _LOGIN_FAILS.items()
if not ts or now - max(ts) > _LOGIN_FAIL_WINDOW]
for u in stale_users[:5000]:
_LOGIN_FAILS.pop(u, None)
if len(_LOGIN_FAILS) > 20000:
for u in list(_LOGIN_FAILS.keys())[:len(_LOGIN_FAILS) // 2]:
_LOGIN_FAILS.pop(u, None)
return len(fails) < _LOGIN_FAIL_LIMIT
def _login_fail_record(username: str) -> None:
_LOGIN_FAILS.setdefault(username, []).append(time.time())
def _login_fail_clear(username: str) -> None:
_LOGIN_FAILS.pop(username, None)
_LOGIN_FAIL_LOGGED.discard(username)
def _login_fail_locked_log_once(username: str) -> bool:
"""锁定周期内的重复被封尝试只落一条 fail 日志,防多 IP 刷审计表;
解锁(窗口过期或成功登录)后进入新周期,才允许再记一条。"""
if username in _LOGIN_FAIL_LOGGED:
return False
_LOGIN_FAIL_LOGGED.add(username)
return True
def _safe_register_credits() -> int:
"""注册赠送次数(settings.register_credits,默认 3)。
防呆:损坏回退默认;<0 一律按 0——设为 -1 会经 create_user 造出"不限次"新号。"""
try:
credits = int(auth.get_setting('register_credits', str(auth.DEFAULT_REGISTER_CREDITS)) or 0)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return auth.DEFAULT_REGISTER_CREDITS
return max(0, credits)
_SEND_CODE_IP = {}
_SEND_CODE_IP_LIMIT = 10
_SEND_CODE_IP_WINDOW = 3600
def _send_code_ip_check(ip: str) -> bool:
"""返回 True 表示允许发送;超限返回 False(表超限时顺手清理过期项,防无界增长)"""
now = time.time()
if len(_SEND_CODE_IP) > 10000:
stale = [k for k, (_, w) in _SEND_CODE_IP.items() if now - w > _SEND_CODE_IP_WINDOW]
for k in stale:
_SEND_CODE_IP.pop(k, None)
cnt, win = _SEND_CODE_IP.get(ip, (0, now))
if now - win > _SEND_CODE_IP_WINDOW:
cnt, win = 0, now
if cnt >= _SEND_CODE_IP_LIMIT:
return False
_SEND_CODE_IP[ip] = (cnt + 1, win)
return True
_RESERVED_USERNAMES = {'admin', 'administrator', 'qfbsh', 'root', 'system', 'moderator', '管理员', '客服'}
def re_username_ok(username: str) -> bool:
import re as _re
# 禁纯下划线/下划线开头结尾("____"、"___admin" 有钓鱼观感风险)
# 白名单收紧为中文/字母/数字/下划线——`\w` 会放行西里尔等同形字符
#("аdmin" 冒充钓鱼);保留字(admin/qfbsh 等)一并拒绝,防冒充管理入口
return bool(_re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9_\u4e00-\u9fa5]{3,20}', username)) and \
not _re.match(r'^_+$', username) and not username.startswith('_') and not username.endswith('_') \
and username.lower() not in _RESERVED_USERNAMES
def secrets_rand() -> int:
import secrets as _s
return _s.randbelow(900000) + 100000