Archived
拆掉两类垫片的最后一处:auth_system 原为同步 sqlite3 栈,web 层与 services 的
worker 只能靠 asyncio.to_thread 逐个桥接才不阻塞事件循环——每次 DB 访问都白付一次
线程池调度,且「同步调异步」的边界散落在 100+ 个调用点。B1 已把 worker 变成协程,
本批把访问层本身也迁到原生异步,两条线在此合拢。
改动(按子系统):
- auth_system:db.py 照 core/db.py 现有范式重建为原生异步访问层(aiosqlite + WAL)
——读路径 _q 每次独立连接、无锁、可并发;写路径 _x / write_transaction 用
asyncio.Lock 串行化,写者不阻塞读者。users / cards / credits / ledger / logs /
settings / mail / geo / backup 九模块随之全部 async/await;security.py 是纯计算
(pbkdf2/normalize)不动。__init__ 去掉 _DB_LOCK 与 get_conn 导出。
- web:app / deps / billing / tasks_registry 与 routers/{admin_site,auth,music,
register,user} 直接 await,拆掉包裹的 to_thread。deps.secret_key 改 async,
连带 _parse_cookie 也 async(会话解析要读密钥)。
- services:_taskcore / tasks / downloads / podcast 的账本调用与查询直接 await。
4 处 start_task 调用点(download.py)确认已 await。
设计取舍(为什么这么做,而不是直接包一层):
- 锁按**事件循环**隔离(_LOOP_LOCKS 以 id(loop) 为键):asyncio.Lock 绑定创建它的
loop,应用主 loop 与测试各自的 loop 并存,跨 loop 复用会抛 "bound to a different
event loop"。
- WAL 切换用**独立锁** _wal_lock 而非 _write_lock:execute() 已持写锁,再在锁内
connect→_configure 会自锁死(asyncio.Lock 非重入)。切换 + 标记在专用锁内串行并
二次复查,否则并发首连会同时执行 PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL 争排他锁报
database is locked(core/db.py 同款教训,实测复现)。
- force_wal 保留:journal_mode 持久化在库文件头,库文件被删重建时新文件不继承,
必须重设。exists() 判定须在 aiosqlite.connect **之前**(connect 会创建空文件)。
- connect() 用 DB_PATH.parent 兜底建目录,优于 DATA_DIR:生产两者相同,但测试
monkeypatch 只换 DB_PATH 时兜底仍能命中正确目录。
留在 to_thread 上的仅剩**正当的阻塞卸载**,不是同步门面:PBKDF2 的 10 万次迭代
(登录链路每次都要跑)、smtplib 发信、备份文件的 copy2 / os.replace、secret.key
的文件 IO。原有 aria2 / downloader / zip 侧的 to_thread 未动。
不变量逐条保持(迁移只改执行模型,不改语义):
- ledger_settle 幂等:账本非 open 直接 return 0,重启后重放不重复退款;
- 终态先到先得:_mark_task_terminal 对已 done/error/canceled 的任务直接 return,
堵住 canceled→error 的非法迁移边;
- settle 必须在任务锁**外**调用(ledger_settle 要抢 SQLite 写锁,busy 最长 15s,
持任务锁会让全站进度/提交/取消随库停摆);
- reserve_and_open 的预扣与开账同事务,消除原两步之间的崩溃丢账窗口。
路径真源红线:DATA_DIR / DB_PATH / BACKUP_DIR / SECRET_KEY_PATH 仍是 auth_system.db
的**模块全局**(用与 core.db 相同的表达式,但**不是**它的别名)。测试只 patch
auth_system.db.*,若改成 core.db 的别名会静默把测试写到生产库。已核 data/site.db
读写前后 sha256 完全一致。
顺带清掉 get_conn:迁移后它只剩「转调 connect()」一层空壳、全仓零消费者(测试
直接开裸连接、备份用 db.connect()),保留等于留一条「拿裸连接自己写」的口子。
测试:19 个文件同步迁移——10 个文件的 web.deps.secret_key 替身改 async;
test_db_conn.py 的多线程首连用例按异步语义拆成 2 条(单 loop gather(16) 覆盖批量
并发首连、WAL 就绪后 8 线程各自 loop 建连覆盖跨 loop);test_billing_scope.py 去掉
多余的 @pytest.mark.anyio;被 await 且**正常返回**的 monkeypatch 替身一律改 async
(仅 raise 的同步替身仍可用)。
门禁:ruff 全过 / pyright 0-0-0(standard 模式含 tests 与顶层模块)/ pytest
384 项全绿(0 失败 0 error 0 skipped;383→384 因 test_db_conn 拆用例)。
data/site.db 读写前后 sha256 一致(a19f5db…6487),无 -wal/-shm 边车残留。
下一步 B3:删 core/sync_http.py、core/async_bridge.py、core/http_errors.py 及
tests/test_async_bridge.py——三者在生产侧已零消费者(http_errors 仅 sync_http
自用,requests 已非声明依赖)。
249 lines
10 KiB
Python
249 lines
10 KiB
Python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
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"""用户增删改查、登录校验与状态。
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(自 auth_system.py 拆出,行为与原实现一致;DB 访问已迁移为原生异步。)
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"""
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import asyncio
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import json
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import sqlite3
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import time
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from typing import Any
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from .db import (
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_q,
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_x,
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write_transaction,
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)
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from .security import (
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_hash_new,
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_normalize_email,
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_verify_password,
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)
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class RegistrationGuard:
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"""注册风控上下文:同 IP 频率闸 + 设备赠送闸。
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这些检查必须与建号 INSERT 在**同一写事务内**完成——锁外预检存在
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TOCTOU(并发同设备双注册各得一次赠送、并发同 IP 挤过限额),所以它们不是
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「可选的附加参数」,而是事务内必须可见的输入。管理建号无风控需求,不传即可。
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"""
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device_id: str = ''
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ip: str = ''
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ua: str = ''
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ip_limit: int = 0
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ip_window: int = 86400
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device_once: bool = False
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async def create_user(username: str, password: str, email: str = '', credits: int = 0,
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role: str = 'user', *,
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guard: RegistrationGuard | None = None) -> sqlite3.Row | None:
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# 余额只接受 -1(不限)或 >= 0;非法负值一律按 0 处理,禁止出现 -2 这类"假不限"
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try:
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credits = int(credits)
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except (TypeError, ValueError):
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credits = 0
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if credits < -1:
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credits = 0
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# 注册入口传 guard=RegistrationGuard(ip_limit=3, device_once=True)——同 IP 24h
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# 注册数检查在写事务内与 INSERT 原子完成,堵住「锁外检查 + 并发插入」
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# 的 TOCTOU 刷号;管理建号不传 guard(即不限制)。超限抛 ValueError 由调用方转 400/429。
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guard = guard or RegistrationGuard()
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now = int(time.time())
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# PBKDF2 10 万次迭代是 CPU 密集(~50ms):在事务外先算好,避免持写锁时
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# 阻塞事件循环(正当的 CPU 卸载,非同步门面)。
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phash = await asyncio.to_thread(_hash_new, password)
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async with write_transaction() as conn:
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if guard.ip_limit > 0 and guard.ip:
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cur = await conn.execute(
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'SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM users WHERE register_ip = ? AND created_at > ?',
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(guard.ip, now - guard.ip_window))
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row = await cur.fetchone()
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n = int(row['n']) if row else 0
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if n >= guard.ip_limit:
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raise ValueError('当前网络注册过于频繁,请 24 小时后再试或联系管理员')
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if guard.device_once and guard.device_id:
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# 设备赠送闸并入同一事务——锁外 device_used 预检有 TOCTOU,
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# 并发同设备双注册可各得一次赠送;锁内复查命中则本次建号不赠送(账号照常创建)
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cur = await conn.execute(
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"SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM users WHERE trial_device = ? AND role != 'admin'",
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(guard.device_id,))
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row = await cur.fetchone()
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if row and int(row['n']) > 0:
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credits = 0
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await conn.execute(
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'INSERT INTO users (username, password_hash, salt, email, role, duration_seconds, '
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'trial_device, register_ip, register_ua, last_active, created_at) '
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'VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)',
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(username, phash, '', email, role,
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-1 if role == 'admin' else int(credits),
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guard.device_id, guard.ip, guard.ua, now, now))
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return await get_user_by_name(username)
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async def get_user_by_name(username: str) -> sqlite3.Row | None:
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rows = await _q('SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ?', (username,))
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return rows[0] if rows else None
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async def get_user_by_email(email: str) -> sqlite3.Row | None:
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"""按邮箱查用户(注册/建号邮箱查重的友好提示;库侧另有唯一索引兜底并发)"""
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email = _normalize_email(email)
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if not email:
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return None
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rows = await _q('SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ? LIMIT 1', (email,))
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return rows[0] if rows else None
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async def register_ip_exceeded(ip: str, limit: int = 3, window: int = 86400) -> bool:
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"""同 IP 24h 内注册数超限(默认 3 次)——防 IP 轮换刷免费赠送次数;
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设备指纹可被客户端伪造,IP 维度是第二道闸。家庭 NAT 场景超限可由管理员建号兜底。"""
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if not ip:
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return False
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rows = await _q('SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM users WHERE register_ip = ? AND created_at > ?',
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(ip, int(time.time() - window)))
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return bool(rows and rows[0]['n'] >= limit)
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async def get_user_by_id(uid: int) -> sqlite3.Row | None:
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rows = await _q('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?', (uid,))
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return rows[0] if rows else None
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async def verify_login(username: str, password: str) -> sqlite3.Row | None:
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"""校验用户名密码。密码正确即返回用户行(含被禁用/封禁账号——
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状态语义由登录路由判断:禁用显示"已被禁用"、封禁显示封禁原因。
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原实现把禁用账号提前过滤成 None,路由的"账号已被禁用"分支永不可达)"""
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user = await get_user_by_name(username)
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if user:
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# PBKDF2 校验是 CPU 密集(~50ms),卸载到线程避免阻塞事件循环(正当 CPU 卸载)
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ok, needs_upgrade = await asyncio.to_thread(
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_verify_password, user['password_hash'], password, user['salt'])
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if ok:
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if needs_upgrade:
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# 存量 SHA-256 哈希在登录成功时透明升级为 PBKDF2
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new_hash = await asyncio.to_thread(_hash_new, password)
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await _x('UPDATE users SET password_hash = ?, salt = \'\' WHERE id = ?',
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(new_hash, user['id']))
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return user
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return None
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async def list_users() -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
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rows = await _q('SELECT * FROM users ORDER BY id DESC')
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return [_user_public(r, full=True) for r in rows]
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async def delete_user(uid: int) -> bool:
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"""删除用户(卡密 used_by 为用户名字符串无外键——删除时同步
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标注"(已注销#id)",管理端卡密列表不再显示悬空的已删用户名)"""
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u = await get_user_by_id(uid)
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if not u or u['role'] == 'admin':
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return False
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async with write_transaction() as conn:
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name = u['username']
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await conn.execute('DELETE FROM users WHERE id = ? AND role != ?', (uid, 'admin'))
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await conn.execute("UPDATE cards SET used_by = used_by || ? WHERE used_by = ?",
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(f'(已注销#{uid})', name))
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return True
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async def reset_password(uid: int, new_password: str) -> bool:
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"""重置密码(同时递增 login_seq,让所有已签发会话立即失效)"""
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new_hash = await asyncio.to_thread(_hash_new, new_password)
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await _x('UPDATE users SET password_hash = ?, salt = \'\', '
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'login_seq = COALESCE(login_seq, 0) + 1 WHERE id = ?',
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(new_hash, uid))
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return True
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async def set_user_status(uid: int, status: int) -> bool:
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"""启用 / 禁用账号(1 启用,0 禁用);管理员账号不可禁用"""
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if status not in (0, 1):
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return False
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row = await _q('SELECT role FROM users WHERE id = ?', (uid,))
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if row and row[0]['role'] == 'admin':
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return False
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return bool(await _x('UPDATE users SET status = ? WHERE id = ?', (status, uid)))
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async def ban_user(uid: int, reason: str = '') -> bool:
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"""封禁账号(管理员不可封)"""
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row = await _q('SELECT role FROM users WHERE id = ?', (uid,))
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if not row or row[0]['role'] == 'admin':
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return False
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return bool(await _x('UPDATE users SET status = 2, ban_reason = ? WHERE id = ?',
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(str(reason or '')[:200], uid)))
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async def unban_user(uid: int) -> bool:
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"""解封账号,恢复正常(清空触发封禁的省份历史,否则下次登录立即再封)"""
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return bool(await _x('UPDATE users SET status = 1, ban_reason = \'\', recent_provinces = \'[]\' WHERE id = ?', (uid,)))
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async def set_user_credits(uid: int, count: int) -> None:
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"""设置用户剩余次数(-1 表示不限)"""
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count = -1 if count < 0 else int(count)
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await _x('UPDATE users SET duration_seconds = ? WHERE id = ?', (count, uid))
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async def set_user_password(uid: int, password: str) -> None:
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# 新哈希 + 递增 login_seq(所有旧会话立即失效)
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new_hash = await asyncio.to_thread(_hash_new, password)
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await _x('UPDATE users SET password_hash = ?, salt = \'\', '
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'login_seq = COALESCE(login_seq, 0) + 1 WHERE id = ?',
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(new_hash, uid))
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async def set_user_netease_cookie(username: str, cookie: str) -> None:
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await _x('UPDATE users SET netease_cookie = ? WHERE username = ?', (cookie, username))
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def _user_public(r: sqlite3.Row, full: bool = False) -> dict[str, Any]:
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d = {
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'id': r['id'],
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'username': r['username'],
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'email': r['email'],
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'role': r['role'],
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'duration_seconds': r['duration_seconds'],
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'created_at': r['created_at'],
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'last_login': r['last_login'],
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'ann_seen': r['ann_seen'],
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}
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if full:
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d.update({
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'status': r['status'] if 'status' in r.keys() else 1,
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'trial_device': r['trial_device'],
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'register_ip': r['register_ip'],
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'register_ua': r['register_ua'],
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# 列表不再携带明文网易云 Cookie(前端只用布尔值;原文按需走
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# /admin/site/user/cookie 单查接口,避免一次列表请求扩散全部用户凭据)
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'has_netease_cookie': bool(r['netease_cookie']),
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'ban_reason': r['ban_reason'] if 'ban_reason' in r.keys() else '',
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'last_province': _last_province(r),
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})
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return d
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def _last_province(r: sqlite3.Row) -> str:
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try:
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history = json.loads(r['recent_provinces'] if 'recent_provinces' in r.keys() and r['recent_provinces'] else '[]')
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return history[-1].get('p', '') if history else ''
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except Exception:
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return ''
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# ============ 免费体验(设备识别) ============
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async def device_used(device_id: str) -> bool:
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if not device_id:
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return False
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rows = await _q("SELECT id FROM users WHERE trial_device = ? AND role != 'admin' LIMIT 1", (device_id,))
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return bool(rows)
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