Archived
refactor!: uv 管理环境 + 彻底删除技术债（Flask 与 requests 全部移除）
## uv 环境管理 - pyproject.toml 声明 dependencies + [dependency-groups].dev，uv.lock 精确锁定 - 删除 requirements.txt / requirements-fastapi.txt / requirements-dev.txt - .python-version = 3.12；Dockerfile 改用 uv sync --frozen（可复现构建） - 新增 jinja2（首页渲染） ## 删除 Flask 技术债 - 从 main.py 用 ast 精确剥离 56 个 Flask 节点（路由/中间件/错误处理/启动）， 框架无关的服务层落为 services/runtime.py（MusicAPIService、下载/打包 worker、 任务监控、缓存清扫），零 Flask 依赖 - 删除 main.py（4527 行）与 auth_routes.py（1050 行） - auth_system.py 移除会话/请求上下文层（login_session/current_user/login_required/ admin_required/_client_ip 等），保留数据与业务层 - 新增 core/net.py（IP 解析）、web/auth_state.py（登录锁定/2FA 票据/发码限流） - FastAPI 侧改直接依赖 services.runtime，不再 import main - web/app.py 去掉 Flask fallback；入口默认根路径模式（API_PREFIX 可选） ## 删除 requests 技术债 - 新增 core/sync_http.py：requests 风格的同步门面（底层 aiohttp 连接池， 流式读取经有界队列背压），含 Session/headers/(connect,read) 元组超时兼容 - core/utils、auth_system、podcast_api、music_downloader、services 全部切换 - 实测真实下载 5.2MB 音频完整成功 ## 质量门禁归零 - ruff：0 错误（B904 全部修复，不再忽略） - pyright：0 错误（类型收窄修复） - pytest：140/140（含 golden 契约回归、root 模式 66 项路径覆盖） - 真实 uvicorn 启动：/health、/、/static、受保护端鉴权全部正确 新增 tests/golden/responses.json：删除 Flask 前捕获的 32 例响应快照， FastAPI 逐字段复现——删除巨石后行为回归仍有硬证据。
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+2
-250
@@ -27,12 +27,9 @@ import time
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from email.header import Header
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from email.mime.text import MIMEText
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from email.utils import formataddr
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from functools import wraps
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Any
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from flask import g, request, session
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# ============ 路径与常量 ============
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DATA_DIR = Path('data')
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DB_PATH = DATA_DIR / 'site.db'
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@@ -465,18 +462,6 @@ def _is_private_ip(ip: str) -> bool:
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return False
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def _is_loopback_ip(ip: str) -> bool:
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"""可信反代判定（第 91 条 P2-4：从"所有内网源"收窄为仅回环地址）。
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服务绑 0.0.0.0 时内网任意主机都可直连伪造 XFF/X-Real-IP 轮换绕过限流与
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登录锁定（实测实锤）；同机 Caddy 反代（127.0.0.1 → Flask）不受影响。"""
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try:
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import ipaddress
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addr = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
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return addr.is_loopback
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except ValueError:
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return False
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def query_ip_province(ip: str) -> str:
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"""查询 IP 归属省份（内网/失败返回空串），带进程内缓存
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F47：改用官方路径 /json/{query} 与 zh-CN 语言参数"""
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@@ -489,7 +474,7 @@ def query_ip_province(ip: str) -> str:
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try:
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import urllib.parse as _ul
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import requests as _rq
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from core import sync_http as _rq
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r = _rq.get('http://ip-api.com/json/' + _ul.quote(ip),
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params={'lang': 'zh-CN', 'fields': 'status,regionName'},
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timeout=5)
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@@ -598,142 +583,6 @@ def _last_province(r: sqlite3.Row) -> str:
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return ''
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# ============ 会话 ============
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def login_session(user: sqlite3.Row) -> None:
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"""登录会话：数据库侧原子递增 login_seq 实现顶号（旧会话自动失效）（F04）"""
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session.permanent = True
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with _DB_LOCK:
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conn = get_conn()
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try:
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conn.execute('UPDATE users SET last_active = ?, last_login = ?, '
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'login_seq = COALESCE(login_seq, 0) + 1 WHERE id = ?',
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(int(time.time()), int(time.time()), user['id']))
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row = conn.execute('SELECT login_seq FROM users WHERE id = ?', (user['id'],)).fetchone()
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conn.commit()
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seq = int(row['login_seq']) if row else 1
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finally:
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conn.close()
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session[SESSION_KEY] = user['id']
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session[SESSION_KEY + '_seq'] = seq
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# P3-23：记录本次签发时间，供滚动续期判断（活跃用户不再登录满 7 天被硬登出）
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session[SESSION_KEY + '_ts'] = int(time.time())
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def _clear_session_only() -> None:
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"""仅清除本浏览器会话字段（不动数据库 login_seq）——
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用于顶号/失效检测路径：清掉旧会话即可，绝不能递增 seq，
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否则会把"刚刚在别处合法登录"的新会话一并踢下线"""
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session.pop(SESSION_KEY, None)
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session.pop(SESSION_KEY + '_seq', None)
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def logout_session() -> None:
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"""退出登录（F03：递增 login_seq，使本账号全部已签发会话 Cookie 立即失效）"""
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uid = session.get(SESSION_KEY)
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_clear_session_only()
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if uid:
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try:
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_x('UPDATE users SET login_seq = COALESCE(login_seq, 0) + 1 WHERE id = ?', (int(uid),))
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except Exception:
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pass
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def current_user() -> sqlite3.Row | None:
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"""当前登录用户（每请求只查一次库：结果缓存到 flask.g。
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一次下载流程会调用本函数 5-6 次——原实现每次都新建 SQLite 连接，公网下是纯浪费。
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缓存含 None：未登录同样只查一次。请求内登录态不会变化（登录/注册路由不走本函数）。）"""
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cached = getattr(g, '_site_current_user', None)
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if cached is not None:
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return cached[0]
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user = _load_current_user()
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g._site_current_user = (user,)
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return user
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def _load_current_user() -> sqlite3.Row | None:
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uid = session.get(SESSION_KEY)
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if not uid:
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return None
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user = get_user_by_id(int(uid))
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if not user:
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return None
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status = user['status'] if 'status' in user.keys() else 1
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if status == 0 or status == 2:
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# 被封禁账号的残留会话：清除并记录一次（只清本会话，不动 seq）
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if status == 2:
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_clear_session_only()
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add_log('fail', user['username'], _client_ip(), '封禁账号访问',
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user['ban_reason'] if 'ban_reason' in user.keys() else '')
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return None
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# 顶号校验（F04）：数据库已有版本号时，会话版本必须严格一致；
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# 缺失/为 0 的会话版本不再放行（防绕过）。检测路径只清本会话，不动 seq。
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db_seq = int(user['login_seq'] if 'login_seq' in user.keys() and user['login_seq'] else 0)
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sess_seq = int(session.get(SESSION_KEY + '_seq') or 0)
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if db_seq and sess_seq != db_seq:
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_clear_session_only()
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add_log('fail', user['username'], _client_ip(), '顶号下线',
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'账号已在其他设备登录或会话已失效，本机会话已下线')
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return None
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# P3-23：滚动续期——会话签发超过一半寿命（3.5 天）时刷新签发时间并 touch 会话，
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# 活跃用户的 Cookie 有效期自动顺延；只有这半天窗口内的请求会带一次 Set-Cookie
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try:
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issued = int(session.get(SESSION_KEY + '_ts') or 0)
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if issued and time.time() - issued > 3.5 * 86400:
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session[SESSION_KEY + '_ts'] = int(time.time())
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session.permanent = True # 触发 cookie 重发（刷新 7 天窗口）
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except Exception:
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pass
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return user
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def _trusted_proxy_ip(header_value: str) -> str:
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"""第 97 条（P2-1）：从可信反代转发的 X-Forwarded-For 中取最右一个可解析 IP。
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最右段是可信反代（Caddy）追加的直连方地址；最左段与 X-Real-IP 均可被客户端
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伪造（Caddy 默认不改写客户端自带的 X-Real-IP），采信它们等于给限流/锁定/省份
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记录开了伪造口。无有效值返回空串，调用方回落 remote_addr。"""
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if not header_value:
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return ''
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import ipaddress as _ipa
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for part in reversed(header_value.split(',')):
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part = part.strip()
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if not part:
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continue
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try:
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return str(_ipa.ip_address(part))
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except ValueError:
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continue
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return ''
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def _client_ip_from_headers(remote: str) -> str:
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"""第 97 条：可信反代场景的客户端 IP 解析（_client_ip 与 main._rate_client_ip 共用）。
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XFF 最右段优先（唯一由可信反代追加的值，客户端伪造的最左段无效）；最右段为
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回环（PassNAT 纯 TCP 隧道下 Caddy 只能看到隧道本机端）时回落采信 X-Real-IP——
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该场景要求隧道开启真实 IP 透传（覆写 X-Real-IP，部署闸 §5.7 B2 必须实测）；
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客户端伪造面已由"Caddy 恒追加 XFF + 仅回环信任"收口。全部无效回落 remote。"""
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fwd = _trusted_proxy_ip(request.headers.get('X-Forwarded-For') or '')
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if fwd and not _is_loopback_ip(fwd):
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return fwd
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xrip = _trusted_proxy_ip(request.headers.get('X-Real-IP') or '')
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if xrip:
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return xrip
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return remote
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def _client_ip() -> str:
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"""客户端 IP（F08：仅当直连方是可信反代时才信任代理头，防伪造绕过限流。
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第 91 条 P2-4：可信范围从"本机/内网"收窄为"仅回环"——绑 0.0.0.0 时内网任意
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主机直连可伪造 XFF 轮换绕过限流/登录锁定（动态实测实锤）。
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第 97 条 P2-1：解析规则见 _client_ip_from_headers——XFF 最右段优先，
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最右段为回环时回落 X-Real-IP（PassNAT 隧道场景），不再无条件读 X-Real-IP）"""
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remote = request.remote_addr or '-'
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if remote != '-' and _is_loopback_ip(remote):
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return _client_ip_from_headers(remote)
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return remote
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# ============ 使用次数（按次计费：一首歌 = 1 次） ============
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@@ -1017,103 +866,6 @@ def ledger_cleanup_settled(max_age_seconds: int = 90 * 86400) -> int:
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return 0
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# ============ 装饰器 ============
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def _deny(message: str, code: int = 401, error_code: str = 'unauthorized') -> tuple[dict[str, Any], int]:
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return ({'status': code, 'success': False, 'message': message, 'error_code': error_code}, code)
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def login_required(action: str = '', cost=None, free: bool = False):
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"""强制登录装饰器：
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- 未登录 401；剩余次数不足本次消耗时 401/expired
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- free=True：解析/试听类接口，仅要求登录，不检查也不扣减次数
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- cost: 可选 callable，返回本次请求消耗次数（下载类：单曲 1 次，批量按歌曲数）
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- A2/B8 统一账本通道：预扣与开账同事务（reserve_and_open，临时键挂在 flask.g）；
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路由创建任务后用 ledger_rename 把账本改挂 task_id，worker 结算唯一入口走账本；
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请求失败（HTTP>=400/异常）时装饰器只对"仍 open 的账本行"结算退款——
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任何路径（含线程启动失败、json 模式）都恰好退一次，杜绝双退/漏退。
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"""
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def deco(fn):
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@wraps(fn)
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def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
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user = current_user()
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if not user:
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return _deny('请先登录后再使用解析功能')
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fresh = get_user_by_id(user['id'])
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if fresh is None:
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# 极小竞态：会话校验通过后、预扣前用户被删除——按未登录收敛，不再 None 解引用 500
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return _deny('登录已失效，请重新登录')
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credits = int(fresh['duration_seconds'] or 0)
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unlimited = fresh['role'] == 'admin' or credits == -1
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need = 0
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reserved = False
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from flask import g as _flask_g
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if not free:
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try:
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need = max(1, int(cost() if cost is not None else 1))
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except Exception:
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need = 1
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if not unlimited:
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key = 'req-' + secrets.token_hex(8)
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remaining = reserve_and_open(fresh['id'], need, key)
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if remaining is None:
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add_log('fail', fresh['username'], _client_ip(), action or request.path,
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f'剩余次数不足（本次需 {need} 次）')
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return _deny(f'下载次数已用尽（本次需 {need} 次，当前 {credits} 次），'
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'请充值卡密后继续下载', error_code='expired')
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_flask_g.billing_ledger_key = key
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reserved = True
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def _refund_open(reason: str) -> None:
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"""A2：仅对仍 open 的账本行全额结算退款（被任务 rename/结算过则跳过）"""
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key = getattr(_flask_g, 'billing_ledger_key', None)
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if not key:
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return
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try:
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row = ledger_get(key)
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if row and row['status'] == 'open':
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ledger_settle(key, 0, reason)
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except Exception:
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pass
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try:
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resp = fn(*args, **kwargs)
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except Exception:
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# 路由内部异常：预扣的次数经账本退回
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if reserved:
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_refund_open('rejected')
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raise
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status = resp[1] if isinstance(resp, tuple) else 200
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if status < 400:
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# P2-15：free 端点（搜索/解析等高频动作）成功不再写逐次 success 日志——
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# 它们与卡密充值/退费/封禁等审计关键日志同表竞争 5000 行配额，
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# 忙站点几小时就把追账依据冲掉；下载/计费/失败路径照常记录
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if action and not free:
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detail = (f'-{need} 次，剩余 {credits - need} 次' if reserved and need > 0 else '')
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add_log('success', fresh['username'], _client_ip(), action, detail)
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elif action and free:
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# 解析类动作改记到 REQ_LOG（管理后台"操作记录"页），不入 logs 表
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pass
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elif action:
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add_log('fail', fresh['username'], _client_ip(), action, f'HTTP {status}')
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if status >= 400 and reserved:
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# 路由失败（404/版权限制等）：预扣的次数经账本退回
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_refund_open('rejected')
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return resp
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return wrapper
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return deco
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def admin_required(fn):
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"""仅站点管理员可用"""
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@wraps(fn)
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def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
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user = current_user()
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if not user or user['role'] != 'admin':
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return _deny('需要管理员权限', 403, 'forbidden')
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return fn(*args, **kwargs)
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return wrapper
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# ============ 日志 ============
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@@ -1697,7 +1449,7 @@ def restore_backup(name: str) -> None:
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# 替换后初始化失败：回滚安全副本，恢复原库
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shutil.copy2(str(safety), str(DB_PATH))
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init_db()
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raise RuntimeError('恢复后数据库初始化失败，已自动回滚到恢复前状态')
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raise RuntimeError('恢复后数据库初始化失败，已自动回滚到恢复前状态') from None
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# 第 94 条（P3-4）：裁剪移出 _DB_LOCK——glob/unlink 的 I/O 不阻塞全站写
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try:
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prune_backups(20, 5)
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